



# Experiences with IDS and Honeypots




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
# Agenda

- Intro
- 2008 – 2009 : Mysphere1
- 2010 : Other work
- 2011 : Mysphere2
- 2012 : Mysphere3 ?
- Trends
- Resume



# Introduction

- What is IDS ?
  - A device or software application that monitors computing environment for malicious activities or policy violations



# mysphere1

- Started at 2006
  - Labrea by Pavel Vachek (of CESNET)
- Several IDS were tested ...
  - Working (actively used)
    - Labrea, Nepenthes, Netflow search, sshcrack.pl
  - Usefull (supplemental usage)
    - apache\_rfi, Hihat, penetration tests
  - Abandoned
    - Google Hack Honeypot, PHP HOP, Snort, PE Hunter



# LaBrea

- Tarpit honeypot (cesnet-csirt)
  - Created as a reaction to CodeRed outbreak
- Labrea tries to slowdown the attack ...
  - Using TCP flow management options
    - Not finishing TCP handshakes
    - Advertises zero sized receiving window
  - Virus execution is slowed down by TCP stack, so virus can't attack elsewhere
- Log > Reporting



# LaBrea

- Daily report (labrea\_report.pl)

- Plots (labrea.loadup)

```
DEBUG: query whois for 216.191.75.193
DEBUG: query whois for 24.80.177.41
DEBUG: query whois for 131.193.39.207
DEBUG: query whois for 217.133.229.193
DEBUG: query whois for 222.133.128.205
DEBUG: query whois for 125.123.145.196
DEBUG: query whois for 24.80.194.248
DEBUG: query whois for 70.67.220.123
Total sessions: 9327
```

Total attackers in ownnet: 1

147.231.xx.194 at 147.228.0.0/14: 36 times


Destination ports listing: 34 in total

```
445:      4566
139:      2094
3306:     654
1080:     383
5405:     266
3128:     252
8800:     252
1433:     252
623:      245
25:       228
111:      88
```

<zkraceno>

Attackers listing: 138 in total

```
213.215.208.132: 497 IT
70.70.124.224: 496 CA
213.80.23.75: 433 SE
66.151.10.1: 266 US
217.106.133.72: 252 RU
122.116.113.218: 228 TW
131.193.39.207: 221 US
81.195.104.242: 220 RU
70.70.18.221: 207 CA
70.71.74.29: 196 CA
64.16.34.34: 183 US
209.82.46.121: 179 CA
```



## Overall

Time frame: 2008-03-19 12:33:27 - 2009-05-09 20:15:31

Last bw at: 2009-05-09 20:15:31 - **1648b/s**

Last target at: 2009-05-09 20:15:02 (**1m ago**) from **79.229.43.213** (p4FE52BD5.dip.t-dialin.net)

Legend: **Port rise** **Port fall** **Well-known port** **Registered port** Dynamic/private/local port



## Ownnet attackers for 30 days

time	held	ips	ipd	psrc	pdst	count	hostname
2009-04-29 11:00:48	0	<b>195.113.1.166</b>	166	3145	21705	1	vvs-pv.cz
2009-04-27 00:16:29	5	<b>146.102.1.48</b>	48	5042	1433	252	vse.cz
2009-04-25 12:50:19	0	<b>195.113.1.128</b>	128	3027	15854	1	cuni.cz
2009-04-16 14:15:23	0	<b>78.128.1.183</b>	183	2530	25724	1	cuni.cz

## Port trends

trend = count(dpst) - avg(last 72 hours)

pdst/name	count	count72	trendRatio
<b>1433/ms-sql-s</b>	31364	91224	<b>0.344</b>
<b>3306/mysql</b>	3368	3086	<b>1.091</b>
<b>22/ssh</b>	1862	618	<b>3.013</b>
<b>23/telnet</b>	1599	682	<b>2.345</b>
<b>25/smtp</b>	1559	683	<b>2.283</b>
<b>445/microsoft-ds</b>	1232	608	<b>2.026</b>
<b>4899/radmin-port</b>	1094	932	<b>1.174</b>
<b>139/netbios-ssn</b>	526	205	<b>2.566</b>
<b>2967/</b>	502	880	<b>0.57</b>
<b>1080/socks</b>	256	90	<b>2.844</b>
<b>8089/</b>	252	425	<b>0.593</b>
<b>21/ftp</b>	252	169	<b>1.491</b>




- Size: 252 addresses

# LaBrea

- The results for the period between 2008 and 2011

- 502 689 attackers in total (unique IPs/day)
- **196 from CESNET** (in graph\*10 !)





# Nepenthes

- ... not only network intel
- Windows SMB emulator
  - Collecting propagated malware
- C++, problematic output
  - Debug log
  - Prelude IDS:
    - + IDMEF, Plugins, HIDS
    - – Python, DB, GUI
    - Not this time
  - SurfIDS:
    - – Plugins, PostgreSQL
- Neither suited our needs, so we created a custom output module







# Nepenthes

- Module log-grep | nepe\_report2.pl

## Plots



### Overall

Time frame: 2009-03-20 14:29:14 - 2009-05-24 11:33:50  
 Last attacker at: 2009-05-24 11:33:50 (35m ago) from 147.228.0.67 ( [redacted] .sou.cz )  
 Legend: Port rise Port fall Well-known port Registered port Dynamic/private/local port

### Ownnet attackers for 30 days

time	held	ips	ipd	psrc	pdst	count	tot size	hostname
2009-05-20 02:07:33	4771	3.215	4824	445	308	9152	[redacted]	.sou.cz
2009-05-11 10:14:09	18800	0.67	1977	445	81574	6719456	[redacted]	.sou.cz
2009-05-04 13:04:30	665	1.133	58676	3140	57635	734070	[redacted]	.cz
2009-05-04 12:19:45	77	1.90	1169	21	22	388	[redacted]	190

### Port trends

trend = count(dport) - avg(last 72 hours)

port/name	count	count72	trendRatio
445/microsoft-ds	80145	77288	0.778
0/	8224	4540	1.865
1434/ms-sql-m	2624	3232	0.812
42/namsrvr	2461	0	2461
21173f	1054	0	1054
4493f	263	0	263
18800f	202	0	202
40720f	202	0	202
13504f	201	0	201
13117f	200	0	200
12198f	891	0	891
21856f	887	0	887
39161f	885	0	885
22832f	883	0	883
13665f	877	0	877
3359f	875	0	875
28590f	875	0	875
27408f	870	0	870
35382f	866	0	866
35442f	865	0	865
139hustbos-sms	0	3719	0

Total sessions: 14375  
 Total events: 60617  
 EV SOCK\_TCP\_RX: 23151  
 EV SOCK\_TCP\_CLOSE: 14068  
 EV SOCK\_TCP\_ACCEPT: 12346  
 EV\_HEXDUMP: 4113  
 EV\_DOWNLOAD: 1734  
 EV\_DIALOGUE\_ASSIGN\_AND\_DONE: 1732  
 EV\_SHELLCODE\_DONE: 1732  
 EV\_SLAMMER: 869  
 EV SOCK\_UDP\_RX: 869  
 EV\_SUBMISSION: 3

Total attackers in ownnet: 1  
 147.228.xx.161 at 147.228.0.0/14: 25064 times

Uniq submissions: 3

SUBMISSION: 5a0e0370ce40bd8aa2c25b2a2e8b347e ftp://1:1058.77.97.100:55083/vPanel  
 -rw-r--r-- 1 nepe1 nepe1 105472 Nov 16 2008 /opt/nepe/var/binaries/5a0e0370ce40bd8aa2c25b2a2e8b347e.virus-labels  
<http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware-analysis/public/SOURCES/5a0e0370ce40bd8aa2c25b2a2e8b347e.virus-labels>

SUBMISSION: 831f4ee0a7d2d1113c80033f8d6ac372 ftp://anonymous:bin@79.41.216.217:5  
 -rw-r--r-- 1 nepe1 nepe1 15872 Mar 4 2008 /opt/nepe/var/binaries/831f4ee0a7d2d1113c80033f8d6ac372.virus-labels  
<http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware-analysis/public/SOURCES/831f4ee0a7d2d1113c80033f8d6ac372.virus-labels>

831f4ee0a7d2d1113c80033f8d6ac372.virus-labels

<http://nepenthes.mwcollect.org/analysis:norman:831f4ee0a7d2d1113c80033f8d6ac372>  
<http://www.honeynet.unam.mx/en/malware.pl?hash=831f4ee0a7d2d1113c80033f8d6ac372>

SUBMISSION: e7801a316bb060178914ae9dbfd0078a ftp://1:1089.136.110.154:63219/Tile  
 -rw-r--r-- 1 nepe1 nepe1 214016 Nov 16 2008 /opt/nepe/var/binaries/e7801a316bb060178914ae9dbfd0078a.virus-labels  
<http://www.cyber-ta.org/releases/malware-analysis/public/SOURCES/e7801a316bb060178914ae9dbfd0078a.virus-labels>


Uniq hexdumps: 33

HEXDUMP: 0f7b92f524b404314c0b6cc6c3e76215: 1  
 -rw-r--r-- 1 nepe1 nepe1 613 Mar 22 19:47 /opt/nepe/var/hexdumps/0f7b92f524b404314c0b6cc6c3e76215:  
 00000000 50 4f 53 54 20 2f 75 6e 61 75 74 68 65 6e 74 69 |POST /unauthenti|  
 00000010 63 61 74 65 64 2f 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 |cated//..%01/..%|  
 00000020 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e |01/..%01/..%01/.|  
 00000030 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 |.%01/..%01/..%01|  
 00000040 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 |/..%01/..%01/..%|  
 00000050 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e |01/..%01/..%01/.|  
 00000060 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 |.%01/..%01/..%01|  
 00000070 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 |/..%01/..%01/..%|  
 00000080 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e |01/..%01/..%01/.|  
 00000090 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 |.%01/..%01/..%01|  
 000000a0 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 |/..%01/..%01/..%|  
 000000b0 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e |01/..%01/..%01/.|  
 000000c0 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 |.%01/..%01/..%01|  
 000000d0 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 |/..%01/..%01/..%|  
 000000e0 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e |01/..%01/..%01/.|  
 000000f0 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 |.%01/..%01/..%01|  
 00000100 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 |/..%01/..%01/..%|  
 00000110 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e |01/..%01/..%01/.|  
 00000120 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 |.%01/..%01/..%01|  
 00000130 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 |/..%01/..%01/..%|  
 00000140 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e |01/..%01/..%01/.|  
 00000150 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 |.%01/..%01/..%01|  
 00000160 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 30 31 2f 2e 2e 25 |/..%01/..%01/..%|  
 <zkraceno>

- Size: 150 address
- The results for the period 2008 – 2011


# Nepenthes

- 128 372 attackers in total (unique IPs/day)
- **160 from CESNET** (in graph \*10 !)
- 580 malware samples captures; but we aren't analysing them any further. Project is old and deprecated in favor of Dionaea ...



# Dionaea


- Service emulator written in Python
  - Nepenthes's successor
  - SMB, HTTP/S, FTP, TFTP, MSSQL, MySQL, SIP
  - IPv6
  - Enhanced shellcode emulation – libemu
    - Syscalls logging, networking and file io...
  - Threaded
  - SQLite database






# Dionaea


- Size: 1 address
- The results for the period 2011 – 2012
  - 6 246 attackers in total (unique IPs/day)
  - 1 from Cesnet (in graph \*10 !)



Geolocation distribution



Attacked services



- But if you don't want to bother with installing some weird piece of software and waste your address space ...

# NetFlow search

- Netflow data analysis – any site in Géant network has already some data about a traffic flows

- SQL – **SELECT sip ... WHERE dp=25 GROUP BY sip HAVING conns > 300**

- spamsearch, sshsearch, winsearch
- Dnssearch ?

- Most efficient sensor !**



**DETECTIVE  
COLUMBO**  
AT YOUR SERVICE...

```
od Cron Daemon
předmět Cron <[redacted]> time (date; /home/bodik/winsearch2.pl; echo; /home/bodik/spamsearch2.pl; echo; /home/bodik/sshsearch2.pl; echo; /home/bodik/websearch2.pl; echo; /home/bodik/dnssearch.pl; echo; /home/bodik/hlidani_zdroju_knihovny.pl; date)
komu bodik@civ.zcu.cz, Ing. Aleš Padrta Ph.D.
```

Thu Sep 22 11:00:00 CEST 2011  
/home/bodik/winsearch2.pl

Time	sum(bytes)	sum(pck)	sip
2011-09-22 11:00:00	455168	9483	147.228.94.110
2011-09-22 11:00:00	657102	12367	147.228.181.102
2011-09-22 11:00:00	86800	1713	147.228.183.85
2011-09-22 11:00:00	1966240	9645	147.228.99.50
2011-09-22 11:00:00	1837402	8856	147.228.153.38
2011-09-22 11:00:00	1505253	6881	147.228.20.103
2011-09-22 11:00:00	39115	724	147.228.182.114

hostname	conns	tgts
el304n01-ket.fel.zcu.cz	4193	4187
eduroam-n258.zcu.cz	1012	2
eduroam-n853.zcu.cz	581	1
kiosek-ng01.zcu.cz	452	2
kiosek-vc02.zcu.cz	354	2
ps203p14-uk.uk.zcu.cz	352	2
eduroam-n626.zcu.cz	304	2

/home/bodik/spamsearch2.pl

Time	sum(bytes)	sum(pck)	sip
2011-09-22 00:00:00	994109	18477	147.228.181.102
2011-09-22 00:00:00	1027734	8043	147.228.19.150
2011-09-22 00:00:00	939549	4585	147.228.181.102

hostname	conns	tgts
1001001-sus.fel.zcu.cz	1583	1
sd206p03-kfi.ff.zcu.cz	564	1
[redacted].zcu.cz	511	1


/home/bodik/sshsearch2.pl

Time	sum(bytes)	sum(pck)	sip
2011-09-22 00:00:00	47513710	117800	147.228.181.102
2011-09-22 00:00:00	1507730	10200	147.228.181.102
2011-09-22 00:00:00	172920	2882	147.228.181.102
2011-09-22 00:00:00	9039369	169451	147.228.181.102
2011-09-22 00:00:00	3354621	67449	147.228.181.102
2011-09-22 00:00:00	244282	3863	147.228.181.102
2011-09-22 15:00:00	1015433	7279	147.228.181.102
2011-09-22 00:00:00	36697255	195889	147.228.101.109
2011-09-22 00:00:00	463808	2658	147.228.43.85
2011-09-22 11:00:00	49424	839	147.228.185.92
2011-09-22 00:00:00	45228774	850891	147.228.209.162
2011-09-22 00:00:00	3864785	48700	147.228.181.102

hostname	conns	tgts
[redacted].zcu.cz	1742	4
[redacted].zcu.cz	1174	5
[redacted].zcu.cz	548	1
[redacted].zcu.cz	507	151
[redacted].zcu.cz	373	20
[redacted].zcu.cz	341	3
[redacted].zcu.cz	198	1
ui322p01-sis.civ.zcu.cz	149	6
konos-fav.zcu.cz	140	1
zcu-mobile-n348.zcu.cz	117	99
kolej-mk-110.zcu.cz	114	9
[redacted].zcu.cz	109	15

# NetFlow search

- In the period 2009 – 2011 there were
  - 515 Spam, 47 ssh, 195 winworm found in WEBnet
    - Graph shows detection rate, not incident count







# Kipo

- You can also be more more creative on ssh ...
- Kipo is a medium interaction honeypot written in Python
  - Python >> multiplatform
    - Linux, FreeBSD, Windows
  - Customizable Linux shell emulator
    - Static responses in .txt (`ifconfig`, `dmesg`)
    - Dynamic commands .py (`ping`, `wget`, ...)

# Kipo

- Size: 1 address
- The results for the period 06/2011 – 02/2012
  - 1 503 attackers in total (unique Ips/day)
  - 130 malware samples (wget downloads)
  - **None of CESNET**



- 130 malware samples collected (wget downloads)

# Kipo malware

- Some of them are really nice ;)
- Why to bother about rootkits, stealing credentials .. they want to play CounterStrike ...

```

~/gn3/brno/kipocases/1/redirect
core_i386.so
cstrike
debug.cmds
debug.log
engine_amd.so
engine_i486.so
engine_i686.so
filesystem_stdio_i386.so
hlds_amd
hlds_i486
hlds_i686
hlds_run
hldsupdateool.bin
InstallRecord.blob
libsteam_api_c_linux.so
libsteam_api_c.so
libsteamvalidateuseridtickets
libtier0_s.so
libvstdlib_s.so
linuxreadme.txt
platform
proxy_i386.so
readme.txt
reslists
SAVE
start
steam
steam_appid.txt
steamclient.so
stop
test1.so
test2.so
test3.so
valve

BARA="\033[1;34m=====
COPY=" - redirect [csservers.ro] [linux ver "$RED"1.2"$NC]"
REGULI=" - numar maxim redirecte: "$RED"15"$NC

if [$ip_extern = ""]; then
ip_ -O- http://www.csservers.ro/ip.php| awk '{gsub(/.*Current IP Add
else
ip_extern=`wget -q -O- http://checkip.dyndns.com/| awk '{gsub(/.*Current IP Address
fi

#ip_extern=192.168.0.1 (inlocuiti 192.168.0.1 cu alt ip extern , stergeti textul ace

echo -e $BARA;
echo -e $COPY;
echo -e $REGULI;
echo -e $BARA;
echo -e $NC' ip extern: '$CYAN$ip_extern
echo -ne $NC' dns server: '$CYAN
read dns_server
echo -e '\n\t'$NC'('$CYAN'clasic'$NC', '$CYAN'respawn'$NC', '$CYAN'hidenseek'$NC', '$CY
echo -ne $NC' mod: '$CYAN
read mod
echo -ne $NC' nume admin: '$CYAN
read nume_admin
echo -ne $NC' numar redirecte: '$CYAN
read NR_RED
echo -ne $NC

echo -e $RED"\n Pornesc redirectele \n"$NC

COUNTER=0;
harta=`wget -q -O- http://www.csservers.ro/harta.php?asdfg=$mod/$COUNTER`
hostname=`wget -q -O- http://www.csservers.ro/mod.php?qwerty=$mod/$dns_serve
screen -d -m ./hlds_run -game cstrike +ip $ip_extern +maxplayers 22 +map $ha
echo -e '\n\t'$NC' Pornit redirectul '$COUNTER' '$NC' \n\t\t num
sleep 1;

port='29000';

COUNTER=1;
while [ $COUNTER -lt $NR_RED ]; do
harta=`wget -q -O- http://www.csservers.ro/harta.php?asdfg=$mod/$COUNTER`
hostname=`wget -q -O- http://www.csservers.ro/mod.php?qwerty=$mod/$dns_serve
screen -d -m ./hlds_run -game cstrike +ip $ip_extern +maxplayers 22 +map $ha
echo -e '\n\t'$NC' Pornit redirectul '$COUNTER' '$NC' \n\t\t num

```



- Fully outsourced distributed gaming cloud service ? **Kipo malware**



- 1596 servere active
- 49401 redirectati pana la ora 16:37:35
- 82364 redirectati ieri
- Castigatori dropuri pentru azi: bb.godplay.ro , locul 2: dr2.godplay.ro
- 21075 jucatori online pe toate serverele la ora 16:37:35

STA SERVERE   ADAUGA SERVER   EVIDENTA REDIRECTELOR LIVE   **FORUM**   CUMPARA COMPONENTE   [CASTIGA DROPURI](#)   MASTER


### REDIRECTE CS PENTRU TOATE SERVERELE DIN ROMANIA

Vrei lista asta de servere (FARA REDIRECTE) la tine in Counter Strike ? Click [AICI](#) sa ti-o instalezi !

	STATUS	DNS SERVER	JUCATORI	HARTA	MOD	RATING
1	SERVER FULL	pgl.indungi.ro	32:32	cs_italy	clasic	100%
2	SERVER FULL	cs.theonecs.ro	32:32	de_abaddon	clasic	100%
3	SERVER FULL	babilonia.indungi.ro	32:32	de_kabul_32	clasic	100%
4	SERVER FULL	cs.indungi.ro	32:32	de_westwood_newstyle	clasic	100%
5	SERVER FULL	constanta.indungi.ro	32:32	de_westwood	clasic	100%
6	SERVER FULL	dn7.onlypro.ro	32:32	de_inferno	clasic	100%
7	SERVER FULL	cs.alphacs.ro	32:32	de_westwood_big	clasic	100%
8	SERVER FULL		32:32			100%

# sshcrack.pl

- Just not let them in ...
- Perl grep auth.log + cron + iptables
  - Autonomous self-defense
  - No monitoring, no development, no problems
    - /afs/zcu.cz/common/tools/sshcrack/sshcrack.pl
    - fail2ban



# Mysphere1: Usefull IDS

- We were also intererested in web malware ...
  - **HIHAT**
    - Tool for creating low and high interaction web based honeypots from any application
    - Logging preamble is inserted in every script/entry point and records all properties of the HTTP requests
    - cca 10x PHP apps, 2x J2EE apps



- Web interface
- `clean_spiders.sh` (never ending story ...)

- Web interface
- `clean_spiders.sh` (never ending story ...)

# Job vs r57

数据库连接类型  
数据库服务器地址  
数据库服务器端口  
数据库用户名  
数据库密码  
数据库名

SQLServer数据库

Database

Database Connection Type

SQLServer Database

Database Server Address

SQLServer Database

Database server port

MySql Database

Database username

Oracle Database

Database password

DB2 Database

Database Name

ODBC Data Source

Connection

Reset

- Jdbc type 4

- Traceback

- IDS also has their vulnerabilities, especially those with high interaction

- Dionaea HTTPD directory traversal  
>> EFF SSL Observatory

```
===== c1 =====string(1027)
<script language="javascript">
  hotlog_js="1.0";
  hotlog_r="" + math.random() + "&s=81606&im=1&r=" + escape(document.referrer) + "&pg=" + escape(document.cookie) + "&path=" + escape(document.location) + "&";
  document.cookie="hotlog=1; path=/";
  hotlog_r+="&c=" + (document.cookie?"y":"n");
</script>
<script language="javascript1.1">
  hotlog_js="1.1";
  hotlog_r+="&j=" + (navigator.javaenabled()?"y":"n");
</script>
<script language="javascript1.2">
  hotlog_js="1.2";
  hotlog_r+="&wh=" + screen.width + 'x' + screen.height + "&px=" + ((navigator.appname.substring(0,3)=="MSI")?"IE":"Netscape") + "&";
</script><script language="javascript1.3">
  hotlog_js="1.3"
</script>
<script language="javascript">
  hotlog_r+="&js=" + hotlog_js;
  document.write("
    <a href='http://click.hotlog.ru/?81606' target='_top'>
    <img src='http://hit4.hotlog.ru/cgi-bin/hotlog/count?"+hotlog_r+"&' border=0 />
  ")
</script>
<noscript>
  <a href=http://click.hotlog.ru/?81606 target=_top>
  
</noscript>
```

# 2010 post mysphere1

- Mysphere1 works ...
  - Students always brings an infected devices ...
    - ... and they'r detected.
    - More incidents ...
      - More work ... oh my






# 2011 – mysphere2

- Mysphere2: Improving the process of security incidents response
  - Development fund Cesnet no. 369 + [civ.zcu.cz](http://civ.zcu.cz)
- Design and implement a *network orchestrator*
  - Automated blocking of computers in campus and locking users in eduroam
  - Don't disconnect them completely, but provide them with proper informations and tools for incident response
    - Jan Goebel, Jens Hektor, Thorsten Holz: Advanced honeypot-based intrusion detection ;login: v.31 n.6 <http://www.usenix.org/publications/login/>
- Link every information about an incident with Request Tracker and other internal agendas ...

# Mysphere2 vs User

- So we created
  - Quarantine network and it's management tool (NetSpy)
    - NetSpy switches access ports vlans
  - Captive portal on router from that network



# Mysphere2 vs User

- Router steals any connection 80/tcp and redirects those to a local web application
- We are sorry, but we have only czech localisation at the moment
  - CakePHP, Doxygene

 **Mysphere2: Automatic management of security incidents** [None]

This computer was disconnected from the WEBnet network

Access to the requested page ... has been denied for security reasons.

Inappropriate behavior was detected on this computer (domain.name.com :: 1.2.3.4), which indicates its infected by a virus. To unlock, please follow one of the following options:



A. Please contact your local administrator ( [support.zcu.cz](http://support.zcu.cz) - [A list of local administrators](#) ), who will help you to solve the issue.

B. Place the computer in an appropriate state by yourself. Instructions can be found on [support.zcu.cz](http://support.zcu.cz) - [Infected computer](#).  
After reinstalling or virus removal connect machine to the network and fill out [an unlock form](#).  
Unlocking can be done immediately after disconnecting the faulty machine from the network, there is no need to wait for reinstallation (it will be useful for example if the access port is shared among several machines).

Despite the block, selected information systems are still available:


- ▶ <https://webmail.zcu.cz>
- ▶ <http://support.zcu.cz>
- ▶ <http://phone.zcu.cz>

Thank you for your cooperation  
CIV (abuse@zcu.cz)



# Mysphere2 and Admin

- Mysphere2 is not just a web page, but it is also a tool for whole incident lifecycle management



# mysphere2

- Mysphere2 automates a lot of stuff = computer aided process for incident response and handling in WEBnet network

mysphere2: Automat pro ... x mysphere2: Automat pro ... x #131555: [sphr2#119] u... x

Mysphere2: incidents incidents/getlabyhostname eduoams responses/show responses redirects types states pages/doc pages/apidoc supp::spra

Incidents

Actions [New Incident](#) [List Types](#) [New Type](#) [List States](#)

	Id	Ip	Mac	Hostname	Text	State	Ty
<a href="#">F</a> <a href="#">R</a>						--	--
<a href="#">F</a> <a href="#">R</a>		Owner	Claimant	Rt	Ctime	Itime	Su
<a href="#">V</a> <a href="#">E</a> <a href="#">D</a>	59	147.228.53.150	00:11:09:d1:1a:18	u505p05-ips.civ.zcu.cz	testovací incident	<a href="#">unblocked</a>	<a href="#">sp</a>
<a href="#">N</a> <a href="#">B</a> <a href="#">U</a> <a href="#">C</a>		bodik	mysphere1	<a href="#">124412</a>	2011-06-29 16:38:00	2011-06-29 16:38:00	<a href="#">sl</a>
<a href="#">V</a> <a href="#">E</a> <a href="#">D</a>	52	147.228.185.145	0c:ee:a6:a6:22:c0	zcu-mobile-n401.zcu.cz	/home/bodik/winsearch2.pl Time sum(bytes) sum(pck) sip	<a href="#">blocked</a>	<a href="#">sc</a>
<a href="#">N</a> <a href="#">B</a> <a href="#">U</a> <a href="#">C</a>		bodik	mysphere1	<a href="#">123355</a>	2011-06-02 08:01:00	2011-06-01 10:00:00	<a href="#">sl</a>
<a href="#">V</a> <a href="#">E</a> <a href="#">D</a>	56	147.228.180.131	00:16:ea:7b:e8:c6	eduroam-n131.zcu.cz	DEBUG: searchradius: epsilon=0, date=2011-06-13 08:44:42, type=sp, starttime=2011-06-13 08:44:00, st	<a href="#">blocked</a>	<a href="#">bo</a>
<a href="#">N</a> <a href="#">B</a> <a href="#">U</a> <a href="#">C</a>		bodik	SSERV	<a href="#">123875</a>	2011-06-16 18:18:00	2011-06-13 08:44:00	<a href="#">sl</a>
<a href="#">V</a> <a href="#">E</a> <a href="#">D</a>	65	147.228.181.181	00:24:2b:04:7b:a3	eduroam-n437.zcu.cz	mysphere1 /home/bodik/winsearch2.pl Time sum(bytes) sum(pck) si	<a href="#">noticed</a>	<a href="#">botnet</a>
<a href="#">N</a> <a href="#">B</a> <a href="#">U</a> <a href="#">C</a>		bodik	sserv	<a href="#">124821</a>	2011-07-13 12:57:00	2011-07-11 15:43:00	<a href="#">g...v.edu.pl</a>
<a href="#">V</a> <a href="#">E</a> <a href="#">D</a>	67	147.228.167.46	00:1a:92:f1:d1:6b	http://eddisson.fpe.zcu.cz/	Evidentiary Information: Notice ID: 22-156395469 Initial Infringement Timestamp: 8 Aug 2011 19	<a href="#">blocked</a>	<a href="#">p2pshare</a>
<a href="#">N</a> <a href="#">B</a> <a href="#">U</a> <a href="#">C</a>		apadria	BayTSP	<a href="#">125702</a>	2011-08-08 21:26:00	2011-08-09 22:58:00	
<a href="#">V</a> <a href="#">E</a> <a href="#">D</a>	77	147.228.180.44	00:24:23:07:e8:4a	eduroam-n44.zcu.cz	infr time je o 5 minut jinde, ale predpokladam ze to bylon ... ----- DEBUG: search	<a href="#">banned</a>	<a href="#">p2pshare</a>

init


notice

block

response

unblock

close



# Mysphere2 resume

- 70 incidents were resolved so far
  - TTUI – Time to user informed
  - TTRF – Time to (user) first reaction
  - TTR – Time to incident resolution


	TTIU [m]	TTRF [m]	TTR [m]
<b>Without Mysphere2</b>			
<b>Average</b>	564	12562	26126
<b>Median</b>	143	2834	7668
<b>With Mysphere2</b>			
<b>Average</b>	1114	5682	10154
<b>Median</b>	392	1583	6013

Mysphere2 helped to shorten the *time to first user response* and the *total time to resolve the incident* to 50% (measured by RequestTracker correspondence time analysis)



# Future work

- Mysphere3 – Honeypots on Ipv6
- Visualization
  - Conti et al
- Statistical modeling
  - `scikit-learn`



# R3sum3

- Security is a process, not a product (B.Schneier<sup>TM</sup>)
  - Stay up-to-date
    - isc.edu, full-disclosure, bh, ccc, defcon, ...
- IDS are very usefull, but can work for and againts you, and it's good to know how and why to build them ...
  - <http://brmlab.cz/project/warzone>
  - <http://code.google.com/p/nets-x/>



VS.



# Experiences with IDS and Honeypots

Q & A ?

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Michal Kostěnek <[kostenec@civ.zcu.cz](mailto:kostenec@civ.zcu.cz)>

Terena.org >> Campus BPD  
CBPD135

